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PROBLEMS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITIES
ARISING OUT OF FEDERAL CONTRACT TERMINATION AND
PROPERTY DISPOSAL
RALPH S. RICEt
I. IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEIS
SuRpLus property subject to disposal by the United States during
and after the war falls into three principal categories: fabricated pro-
ducts (including materials, supplies and equipment which have been
used in or purchased for the prosecution of the war), termination in-
ventories (where title to all or a part of the inventory is held by the
United States as an incident of a contract termination), and plant and
production facilities. In the absence of federal immunity from state
and local taxation the ownership, sale, and use of such properties
would be subject to multiple state and local taxes, including ad valorem
taxes on real and personal property, sales, use and occupational taxes,
and some license and registration fees. The importance of the problems
arising in the application of such taxes to contract termination and
property disposal is apparent from the facts that about one-fifth of the
total industrial facilities of the United States are government-omed,
representing a federal investment of approximately sixteen billion
dollars,' and that surplus property in the hands of owning and dis-
posal agencies currently amounts to almost one billion, four hundred
million dollars in terms of procurement costs.2 The magnitude of the
problem is further reflected in a Congressional committee estimate
that the dollar valuation of stocks and supplies subject to post-war
disposal by the United States would approximate fifty to sixty billion
dollars. 3
Sales, use, and occupational taxes are normally only two or three
t Lieutenant, USNR; Tax Officer, Office of Judge Advocate General, Navy Depart-
ment. The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the Navy Department. The
author is indebted to Lt. N. Barr Miller, USNR, and Lt. (jg) Fred Wolf, Jr., USNR, v.hcg
comments respecting the draft of this article have been most helpful.
1. See testimony of Hans Klagsbrunn, Vice President of Defence Plants Corporation,
quoted in the report of the War Contracts Subcommittee of the Committee on Military
Affairs pursuant to S. Res. 198, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. (1944) is.
2. Summary of Secoia Quarterly Report of Surplus Property Board, 91 Cong. Rec., June
12, 1945, at 6078.
3. It is, of course, impossible to estimate accurately the quantum of perzonal prolprty
which will become surplus after the war, since the volume and value of the prop2rty will
depend on the exactitude with which estimates of military requirements are hereafter made.
However, an excellent discussion of the prospective amount and nature of curplus war
realty and personalty is incorporated in the report of the House Special Committee on
Post-W'Var Economic Policy and Planning. H. R. RPP. No. 1355, 78th Cong. 2d Fesa. (1944)
9 et seq.
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per cent of the sales price of the property sold, and the amount of tax
involved thus will be a limited proportion of the expense of the recon-
version program.4 However, the economic effect of such taxes may
well exceed the amounts involved. Any factors which tend to obscure
the respective rights, and obligations of the United States, state and
local taxing jurisdictions, contractors, and consumers serve materially
to retard informed and speedy contract termination and surplus prop-
erty disposition; and, because of the substantial amount of surplus
property owned by the Federal Government, any delay in disposition
would have a correspondingly significant effect upon the national
economy. '
Moreover, the application of state and local taxes to disposition of
surplus properties requires careful reconciliation of the interests of the
states and the United States. Revenue collections are of obvious im-
portance to state and local governments, some of which have displayed
an increasing tendency to enlarge revenues at the expense of the federal
treasury.6 Accordingly, state and local tax officials may be expected
to require payment of taxes by the United States where such taxes can
be constitutionally imposed, and to solicit the voluntary cooperation
of the United States in enforcing taxing statutes where the thrust of
the statutes is addressed to purchasers of surplus property rather than
the United States. On the other hand, where the United States is
immune from the tax, agencies or employees of the United States are
4. Most states having sales taxes impose the tax only with respect to retail sales. The
practical effect of immunity of the United States from state excise taxes thus will be further
limited because sales of surplus personal property by the United States will normally be
made to commercial distributors and retailers under the requirements of Section 2(n) of
the Surplus Property Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 457, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 3, 1944)
(hereinafter referred to as the Act). Sales to consumers are, however, being made where
single items of high value are involved. See the testimony of William Clayton, formerly
Surplus War Property Administrator, Hearings before Special Committee on Post-War
Economic Policy and Planning Pursuant to H. Res. 408, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 53.
Moreover, sales of contractor inventory owned by the United States will be made in part
through contractors and some proportion of this property may go to consumers.
5. Prompt action has been emphasized as a basic policy in establishment of pro-
cedures for disposition of property. Section 2(r) of the Act provides that the Administrator,
in formulating regulations to govern the disposition of surplus property shall give effect
to the following policy: "to dispose of surplus property as promptly as feasible without
fostering monopoly or restraint of trade, or unduly disturbing the economy, or encouraging
hoarding of such property, and to facilitate prompt redistribution of such property to con-
sumers." Absence of clarification of the rights of all persons participating in surplus prop-
erty disposition undoubtedly is largely responsible for current delay in property disposal.
Only sixteen percent of available surpluses were disposed of between June 1944 and March
1945. "Summary of Second Quarterly Report of Surplus Property Board" 91 Cong. Ree.
June 12, 1945, at 6078.
6. See, e.g., Tenn. Laws 1945, c. 151, seeking to require additional unemployment
compensation contributions from employers engaged in work in federally-owned plants
under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts with the United States.
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prohibited, in the absence of specific Congressional approval, from
paying to the states taxes respecting the ownership, sale, or use of sur-
plus property.7 An obvious need thus exists for an accurate delineation
of the scope of the immunities doctrine as applied to termination and
disposal procedures in order that a sound basis may be established for
mutual forbearance and cooperation between the states and the United
States in the solution of their tax problems.
II. TERMINATION AND PROPERTY DisposAL PROCEDURES
Under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 3 the holder of a contract
with the Federal Government is normally indemnified for losses he
sustains by reason of its termination.9 It is the policy of the Govern-
ment to provide contractors with speedy compensation, 0 but, since
some delay is inevitable, the Act establishes detailed procedures for
interim financing while claims are being processed.11 The contractor
is encouraged by the War and Navy Departments to retain or sell
materials, supplies, and partially fabricated and fabricated articles on
hand at termination, whether title to the articles rests in the United
States or the contractor, and to make claim for the losses, if any, sus-
tained in connection with the sale or retention.12 Consequently, it is
hoped that a relatively small volume of termination inventories will
be sold by the United States itself.
Persoiwl Property. It is obvious that most surplus personal property
of the United States will be owned by the War and Na-y Departments,
the Maritime Commission, and procurement agencies such as the War
Food Administration, the Defense Supplies Corporation and the Pro-
curement Division of the Treasury Department. For the duration of
the war each of these agencies will determine which property under its
control is to be designated as surplus, 3 and, except where specifically
authorized to dispose of property, each is required to certify property
as surplus to so-called "disposal agencies" which are empowered to sell
the property when such certification is received.
Where surplus personal property accrues from sources other than
contract termination, the civilian agencies of the United States nor-
mally dispose of the property. Thus, capital and producers' goods will
7. REV. STAT. § 3224 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 241 (1934); Comptroller General of the
United States, General Regulation No. 86 as amended June 11, 1937.
S. Pub. L. No. 395. 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 1, 1944).
9. Id. at § 6(d).
10. Id. at § I(b).
11. Id.at § 6(a).
12. The contracting officers of the War and Navy Departments may of courze require
that no disposition of Government-furnished equipment and materials be effected vthout
approval. Joint Army-Navy Termination Regulation, 9 FED. REo. 13316 (1944) (herein-
after cited as JTR) §§ 411,441.
13. Sur'rLus PROPERTyAcT § 11(a).
1945l
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be sold by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, maritime property
will be sold by the Maritime Commission, and agricultural commodi-
ties will be sold by the War Food Administration.14 In addition,
the War and Navy Departments are authorized to dispose of nominal
quantities of property, scrap and salvage, such equipment and mate-
rials as may be needed by industrial users engaged in war production,
and, where acting through the contractors, termination inventories."
In all other cases the property will be certified as surplus to the ap-
propriate disposal agency and sold by such agency.
Real Property. Procedures for disposal of real property currently
parallel procedures for disposition of personal property. Most of the
industrial properties now owned by the United States are under the
control of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the National
Housing Agency.'" This real property as well as most of the real prop-
erty owned by other branches of the Federal Government (including
the War and Navy Departments) will be certified to these agencies for
disposition." While the Congressional intention that sales of property
shall be expedited to the greatest possible extent is manifest,"8 delay in
disposition of real property (and a consequent increase in tax problems)
appears inevitable. 9
14. By Section 10(a) of the Act, the Board is empowered to designate Government
agencies to act as disposal agencies, except as designated by the Act. Section 10(b) allocates
disposal of merchant vessels to the Maritime Commission and Section 21(a) authorizes the
War Food Administrator, under supervision of the Board, to establish policies for disposal
of surplus food. Detailed designation of disposal agencies has recently been made by the
Board. Surplus Property Board Regulation No. 1, 10 FED. REG. 3764 (1945).
15. SURPLUS PROPERTY AcT § 14; Surplus War Property Administration Statement of
Policy, April 21, 1944; Surplus Var Property Administration Regulation No. 1, 9 FED.
REG. 5096 (1944); JTR § 454.3.
16. See note 1 supra.
17. Surplus Property Board Regulation No. 1, 10 FED. REG. 3764 (1945).
18. See note 5 supra.
19. A reluctance of owning agencies to part with real property may be expected until
it appears unmistakably clear that such property will be of no value. Complex procedures
will be needed to secure the best price obtainable for the United States, and give effect to
the prohibitions of Section 1 of the Act against fostering monopoly or restraint of trade, or
unduly disturbing domestic economy. Delay may be expected under Sections 19 and 23 of
the Act, requiring that surplus property be reported to Congress, Section 12, establishing
procedures to insure preferential treatment to former owners, tenants, and veterans, and
Sections 12 and 13, establishing procedures for disposal to federal, state and local agencies.
Moreover, retention by the United States of title or a beneficial interest (or both) in surplus
real estate may be anticipated to insure payment of the purchase price and in some cases
control over the development and use of the property.
To date, only 189,000 acres out of a total of 9,000,000 acres and 26,000 parcels have
been declared surplus. Summary of Second Quarterly Report of Surplus Properly Board,
91 Cong. Rec., June 12, 1945, at 6078.
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III. DIsPosITION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY: S.LES, GROSS INCoE
AND OCCuPATION.L TAXEs
General Tests of Intergovernmztal Immuniy. Although the trend
toward restriction of immunity is clear, ' judicial attempts to designate
which state and local taxes are proper and which improper have re-
sulted in a welter of conflicting precedent. 2' However, two general
principles are well established. First, it is clear that Congress may
either specifically prohibit 22 or permit 2-3 taxation of property owned
20. Even where relatively direct taxes have been imposed on arms of the Federal Gov-
ernment, immunity from tax has been carefully restricted. See Penn Dairies v. Mill: Con-
trol Comm., 318 U. S. 261, 271 (1943): "Even in the case of agencies created or appginted
to do the government's work we have been slow to infer an immunity which Congress has
not granted and which Congressional policy does not require." The Court citez, as illustra-
tive of this trend, Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81
(1941), and Colorado National Bank v. Bedford, 310 U. S. 41 (1940). comparing with them
Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 209 (1936).
21. Compare the views of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Stone, spea':ing for the
Court in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 419 (1938): "In a period marked by a con-
stant expansion of government activities and the steady multiplication of the comp!exites
of taxing systems, it is perhaps too much to expect that the judicial pronouncements marl:-
ing the boundaries of state immunity should present a completely logical pattern." Con-
fusion is added by the failure of the Court to overrule specifically cases which no longer can
be considered to represent the law. For example, in view of the decision in Helvering v.
Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938), specifically overruling Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257
U. S. 501 (1922), and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 2S5 U. S. 393 (1932), it sems
probable that the conclusions reached in Choctaw & Gulf R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292
(1914), Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522 (1916), and Jaybird Mining Co. v. Wvdr,
271 U. S. 609 (1926), will no longer be considered binding on the Court. Similarly, the dcci-
sion in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941), specifically overruling Panhandle Oil
Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928), Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 (1936), and
James -. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937), may hereafter be thought to have
overruled by implication a major portion of the rationale of the decisions in Indian Moto-
cycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 (1931); WNilliamsv. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404 (1912);
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888); Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460
(1881); Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5 (U. S. 1873).
22. Where Congress, acting within its constitutional powers to create an instrumental-
ity or conduct the business of the Federal Government, has specifically directed that the
instrumentality or the conduct of the business shall be exempt from state and local taxation,
such taxation is void where contravening the Congressional directive, whether the taxes are
assessed against payment of veterans' compensation benefitz, Trotter v. Tennessee, 20
U. S. 354 (1933); Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U. S. 245 (1937); or Indian lands, Choate v. Trapp,
224 U. S. 665 (1912); Board of County Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705 (1943); or
registration of documents, Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374 (1923,; Pittman
v. Home Owners' Loan Corp.. 30 U. S. 21 (1939). Where an arm of the Federal Govern-
ment was involved, Congress has constitutionally prohibited sales taxes on prop2rty pur-
chased, Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95 (1941); bonds izscd,
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921); and stocks owned by a federal
instrumentality, Maricopa County %% Valley National Bank, 318 U. S. 357 (1943); or capital
and reserves held by it, Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 209 (1936).
In the most recent affirmance of the doctrine, the Court sustained the immunity of the
Federal Public Housing Authority from state and local taxation. City of Cleveland v.
United States, 323 U. S. 329 (1945).
23. See Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Vall. 573, 583, 585 (U. S. 1865); Bank v. Supar-
19451
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by or transactions involving federal instrumentalities. Second, in the
absence of a specific permission or prohibition by Congress, the court
will endeavor to ascertain Congressional intention from the setting of
the specific legislation 24 and the history of legislation authorizing the
federal enterprise subjected to taxation. These general principles are
particularly important in this discussion because Congress has neither
expressly authorized nor forbidden taxation affecting contract termina-
tion or surplus property disposal.
Immunity from Tax: In General. In considering the immunity of
federal agencies from taxation, it is important to note that independent
contractors have not been considered generally to be such instru-
mentalities of government as to be cloaked with the immunity of the
sovereign. 25 Accordingly, when sales, use, and occupation taxes are
visors, 7 Wall. 26, 30, 31 (U. S. 1868); Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579, 588, 590
(U. S. 1869); People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539, 543 (1879); Mercantile Bank v. New York,
121 U. S. 138, 154 (1887); Central Pacific R. R. v. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512 (1896); Northern
Pacific R. R. v. Myers, 172 U. S. 589, 598, 599 (1899); Owensboro National Bank v. Owens-
boro, 173 U. S. 664, 668 (1899); Farmers Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 521 (1914);
Choctaw & Gulf R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292 (1914); Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil
Corp., 276 U. S. 575, 581 (1928); Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries Inc., 296 U. S. 521, 525,
526 (1936); Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 209, 211, 212
(1936); British-American Oil Co. v. Board, 299 U. S. 159 (1936); James v. Dravo Contract-
ing Co., 302 U. S. 134, 161 (1937); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 411, 412 (1938).
In recent years Congress has not infrequently waived immunity of property of the United
States from state and local taxation. HOME OWNERS' LOAN ACT, 48 STAT. 130 (1933), 12
U. S. C. § 1463(c) (1940); FARM CREDIT ACT, 48 STAT. 267 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 1138(c)
(1940); 48 STAT. 993 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 124(a) (1940); FEDERAL CREDIT UNION ACT,
48 STAT. 1222 (1934), 12 U. S. C. § 1768 (1940); NATIONAL HOUSING ACT, 48 STAT. 1252
(1934), 12 U. S. C. § 1714 (1940); 49 STAT. 1160 (1936); 50 STAT. 68 (1937); BANxiIEAD-
JONEs FARm TENANT AcT, 50 STAT. 531 (1937), 7 U. S. C. § 1024 (1940); 50 STAT. 806 (1937),
25 U. S. C. § 510 (1940). So, also, Congress has authorized payments by agencies of the
United States of sums in lieu of taxes. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ACT, 48 STAT. 66
(1933), 16 U. S. C. § 831(l) (1940); 48 STAT. 577 (1934); 49 STAT. 2026 (1936), 40 U. S. C.
§ 422 (1940); 49 STAT, 2036 (1936), 40 U. S. C. § 432 (1940); SECOND DEFICIENCY AP'RO-
PRIATION AT FOR 1937, 50 STAT. 221 (1937); BANKHEAD-JONES FARM TENANT ACT, 50
STAT. 531 (1937), 7 U. S. C. § 1024 (1940); INTERIOR DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION ACT,
50 STAT. 570 (1937); 50 STAT. 876 (1937); UNITED STATES HOUSING ACT, 50 STAT. 895
(1937), 42 U. S. C. § 1413(c) (1940). Whenever permission to tax is extended, such permis-
sion will be strictly construed. Pacific Co., Ltd. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480, 491 (1932);
Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries, Inc., 296 U. S. 521, 526 (1936); Maricopa County v. Val-
ley National Bank, 318 U. S. 357 (1943).
24. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 522-4 (1926); Shaw v. Gibson-
Zahniser Oil Corporation, 276.U. S. 575, 578 (1928); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441,
447 (1943); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 411 (1938). Cf. the comments of Dr.
Powell in The Waning of Tax Immunities (1945) 58 HARV. L. REV. 633, 669-70, respecting
the presentation of the argument of Congressional intention in the brief of the United
States in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941).
25. Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579 (U. S. 1869); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,
269 U. S. 514 (1926); Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 (1934);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937); Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission
[Vol. 54: 665
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITIES
levied upon materials purchased by an independent contractor and
thereafter consumed or processed, the contractor is not relieved of the
burden of the tax merely because he has contracted for sale of the
completed article to the Federal Government.2 It is equally clear that
where a state tax is levied directly upon the operations of an arm of the
Federal Government, the tax comes within the prohibition originally
enunciated in _MlcCidloch v. lfaryland. 
27
At first it was held that taxes measured by the value of commodities
sold or services rendered directly to the United States by independent
contractors engaged in the discharge of a governmental function im-
peded the operations of the United States and, hence, violated the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity from taxation. -J Implicit in
the decisions was the conclusion that the imposition of the economic
burden of a tax on the United States by the states was an unwarranted
interference with federal functions. But with the widespread adop-
tion of excise taxes by the states it was concluded that where taxes
directly measured by the value of commodities sold or services rendered
were imposed upon a contractor with the United States, the tax was
valid as long as the legal incidence of the tax was on the contractor,
rather than the United States 29 and that such a tax was not invalid
merely because its economic burden was passed on to the United
States.0° The effect of the decisions discarding the "economic burden"
302 U. S. 186 (1937); Helvering v. Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1933); Buckstaff Bath
House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 35S (1939); Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commnzion,
318 U. S. 261 (1943). Cf. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 188 (1944),
where Mr. Justice Jackson speaking for the Court stated: "a state may tax personal prop-
erty. . . but it could hardly tax one of its citizens because of moneys... which were in
his possession as ...federal officer, agent or contrador." (Emphasis supplied.)
26. Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 (1934).
27. Justice Jackson has observed: "Most of the immunity cases we have been called
upon to deal with involved assertion of a right to tax Government property against an in-
dividual." United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 188 (1944). Hence the qu-
tion is not often squarely presented. In Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. 5. 341
(1923), however, where a suit was brought by a corporation of the United States to cancel
taxes levied by the-county and the state the Court held that the tax in question could not
be imposed; and in Mlayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441 (1943), the United States was held
immune from an inspection fee levied by the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture.
28. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 213 (1928); Graves v. Te.as Co., 293
U. S. 393 (1936); cf. Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 2S3 U. S. 570 (1931) (dealing
with the imposition of a federal tax on a sale to a municipality).
29. See cases cited infra note 37. Similar cases dealing with state regulation, rather
than taxation, of federal activities include Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commiscion,
318 U. S. 261 (1943), where, in the absence of Congressional action, the Court refused to
adopt a theory of the Attorney General that the legal incidence of a state regulation fixing
ceiling prices for milk was on the United States because the law fixed the terms on which
the United States might purchase Army supplies from citizens of the state, and that such
a law passed beyond the realm of local affairs and became a direct regulation of the United
States.
30. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937); Silas Mlason Co. v. Tax
1945]
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theory where state excise taxes were involved was to include such
taxes within the well established principle that state and local prop-
erty taxes might be constitutionally assessed against property owned
and used by contractors in the discharge of contractual duties with
the United States.3'
Immunity from Tax: "Legal Incidence" of the Tax. An apparently
simple criterion is that of "legal incidence," by which a tax is in-
valid if it is laid upon the United States. But such simplicity is illu-
sory, since it may be difficult to determine when the tax is in fact
laid on the Federal Government. This difficulty is illustrated by sales
taxes which are assessed in the first instance against vendors of com-
modities. 32 For example, certain state statutes permit 33 or require 34
the vendors to pass such taxes on to the vendee, while in other states
the taxing statute makes no reference to the right or duty of the vendor
to pass the burden of the tax. 5 In cases where the United States is the
vendee, the question of the legal incidence of taxes under such statutes
becomes important. The incidence of the tax apparently is to be deter-
Commission, 302 U. S. 186 (1937); Helvering v. Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938); see
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 416 (1938), and cases cited; Graves v. New York,
306 U. S. 466 (1939); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941); Curry v. United States,
314 U. S. 14 (1941); cf. Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U. S. 261 (1943). See
also Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 580 (1931), where in a dissent
Justice Stone expressed doubt that the economic burden of retail sales taxes was in fact
shifted to the government purchaser.
31. It has always been conceded that no constitutional limitations prohibit a non-
discriminatory tax on property owned by an independent contractor with the Federal Gov-
ernment, although such property was used in the course of his duties as contractor. Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (U. S. 1819); Osborn v. United States Bank,
9 Wheat. 738, 867 (U. S. 1824); Railroad Company v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 33 (U. S. 1873);
see Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 177 (1886).
32. It should be noted that the requirement that the "legal incidence" of the tax must
be upon the United States has been adopted primarily with respect to sales or other taxes
measured by the value of commodities sold. For example, the doctrine obviously has no
application in the cases involving stocks and bonds, as pointed out in the majority opinion
in the Dravo case, 302 U. S. 134, 152 (1937), or in cases where a registration tax was as-
sessed upon documents issued in governmental affairs. In the latter case, note the decision
in Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374 (1923), holding that a state registration
tax could not be applied to a first mortgage executed to a Federal Land Bank. As to the
contention of the state that the tax was actually levied against the borrower rather than
the lender, the Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, said: "It is said that the lender may
collect the money in advance from the borrower. We do not perceive that this makes any
difference. The statute says that the lender must pay the tax, but whoever pays it it is a tax
upon the mortgage and that is what is forbidden by the law of the United States." Id. at
378. The distinction is obviously one of expedience rather than logic.
33. See, e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) §§ 105-165.
34. See, e.g., ALA. CODE (1940) Tit. 51, § 776; CALiF. REV. & TAxATiON CODe (Deer-
ing, 1944) §§ 6052, 6053; Mo. REv. STAT. AN. (1943) § 11411; WAs,. REV. STAT. (Reming-
ton, Supp. 1940) § 8370-21.
35. See, e.g., MIcE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp. 1944) §§ 7.521 el seq.
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mined by the ta-dng statute itself, and weight is given to the interpreta-
tion of the statute by the state courts." However, it appears from
recent cases that where the statute merely authorizes the vendor to
pass on the tax to the vendee, or is silent on the subject, the legal
incidence is on the vendor rather than on the person to whom the
economic burden of the tax is passedYr On the other hand, it appears
36. See Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 99 (1941); Colorado
National Bank v. Bedford, 310 U. S. 41, 52 (1940); Clement National Ban! v. Vermont, 231
U. S. 120, 134 (1913), and cases cited.
37. In early cases where a taxpayer was permitted by statute to pass the economic
burden of the tax to another it was held that the "legal incidence" of the tax re, ted on the
one to whom the tax was passed. In deciding United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322
(U. S. 1872), the Court considered a statute providing that certain corporations, including
railroads, must pay a tax of five per cent of the interest paid to bondholders by the corpora-
tion, and authorized, but did not require, the corporation to deduct this tax from payments
of interest to the bondholders. The Court held that the ta% was invalid in so far as applied
to bonds held by a municipal corporation, pointing out that the tax "is no pzcuniary burden
upon the corporation, and no taxation of the corporation. The burden falls on the creditor.
He is the party taxed." Id. at 327. The Court followed a similar dictum in Railroad Co. v.
Jackson, 7 Wall. 262, 269 (U. S. 186S). The holding in the principal case ;as EubTequcntly
approved in Stockdale v. The Insurance Cos., 20 Wall. 323, 329 (U. S. 1873). Application
of this principle to a vendee and a vendor of services was made in Colorado National Bank v.
Bedford, 310 U. S. 41 (1940), where a statutory provision that a bank, payer of a tax on
safety deposit services, should add the amount of the tax, as far as practicable, to the amount
charged, was interpreted by Justice Reed to mean that the tax was required to Ee parzd
on and hence the tax was not upon the bank but upon the customer.
In Railroad Co. v. Collector, 100 U. S. 595 (1879), and United States v. Erie Ry., 105
U. S. 327 (1882), the Court considered the application of a dividend tax to corporations
under a statute providing that the corporations could deduct the taxes paid from the divi-
dends subsequently allowed to stockholders. Although, as was pointed out in a strong
dissent by Mr. Justice Field, the factual situation in the latter case was identical to that in
United Sates v. Railroad Company, the Court held that the tax was in fact upon the corpora-
tion and might be collected even in cases where dividends were payable to non-rezident
aliens who were not taxable. In New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265 (1886), the Court
considered a tax measured by the v'alue of stock in a lottery enterprise. The tax was nomi-
nally placed on the shares of the stockholders, although it was to be paid by the company
which was authorized, but not required, to collect the amount so paid from the shareholders.
It was held that "a tax such as that sought to be imposed upon the company by the appllee:,
is a tax upon the corporation within the meaning or the prohibition of its charter, becau:a
it is compelled to become surety for taxes nominally imposed upon its stockholders, and is
made liable primarily for their payment; a payment which, in the first instance, must L
made out of the corporate property, without other recourse than an action against in-
dividual stockholders to recover the amounts advanced on their account." Id. at 279.
In view of the present trend of authority, it seems probable that the above noted
lapse in the Bedford case lacks significance. In the field of excise taxes, recent decisions of
the Court make it clear that there must be something more than mere pasage of the eco-
nomic burden of a tax by the original taxpayer to the United States in order to involze the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity from taxation. James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,
302 U. S. 134 (1937); -Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941). There is obviou ly
nothing more than passage of the economic burden of a tax under statutes which merely
authorize passage of the tax, or are silent on the question. The Court so held, sub dilentio,
in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra, dealing with gross receipts taxe2. Since both
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that a statutory requirement that a tax be passed on by the vendor
places the "legal incidence" of the tax upon the vendee for purposes of
the immunities doctrine;3 and, in the absence of such a statutory
requirement, specific statutory authority for a refund of the tax to the
vendee has been held to place the legal incidence of the tax upon the
vendee."
Thus, in the absence of a requirement or a provision for refund of the
tax to the vendee, a mere showing that vendors in practice passed on
the tax to the vendee as a separate item of cost would not establish
that the legal incidence of the tax was upon the United States where
it is a vendee. To those familiar with the operation of such taxes, or
engaged in nation-wide procurement, such a view is highly unrealistic,
for in practice sales taxes and some occupational taxes are in fact
passed on to the vendee, often as a separate item of cost. The economic
burden upon and practical interference with the functions of the
Federal Government are the same whether the tax is passed on under
a'statutory requirement (the sale then being immune from taxation
if the United States is a party) or trade practice (in which case the tax
is applicable); and to grant intergovernmental immunity from excise
taxes on the basis of statutory refund provisions appears equally
artificial.
Limitations on Procedures for Disposition of Personal Property.
Where a state or local taxing statute is such that, under the preceding
paragraphs, it may be said that the legal incidence of the tax is on the
vendee, any transfer of title to termination inventory or other property
from a contractor to the United States is immune from tax. 'If, under
the preceding paragraphs, the tax is determined to be on the vendor
(subject to the usual statutory provisions that sales for the purpose of
resale are exempt), no current principles of intergovernmental im-
gross receipts taxes and so-called "vendor" sales taxes are imposed solely on the vendor
and are measured by gross receipts from sales and services, the same holding may be an-
ticipated where vendor sales taxes are involved. Substantially similar results were reached
in connection with other excise taxes as indicated by the cases cited infra note 45.
38. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95 (1941); School District
v. Pfost, 51 Idaho 240,4 P. (2d) 893 (1931).
39. Stahmann v. Vidal, 305 U.S. 61 (1938) semble, holding that where processing taxes
were intended to fall on cotton producers but were assessed against ginners, there being no
requirement that the tax be passed on, the producer was the person liable for the tax, and
hence the legal incidence of the tax fell upon him, especially since refunds were to be made
to the producers. In Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934), it was similarly
held that an Iowa statute taxing motor fuel, levying a fee on distributors and requiring
retailers to post with prices an announcement that the license fee was included, was a tax
on the purchaser. The Court held that the statutes in question "lay no tax whatever upon
distributors, but make of them mere collectors from users of motor vehicle fuel, and refund
the tax only to that class of users upon whom no excise is intended to be laid. The dis-
tributor does not pay the tax; the user does." Id. at 95.
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munity appear to deny the validity of the exaction as applied to trans-
fers by the contractor to the United States.
Where sales of surplus personal property are made by the United
States, and the state or local taxing statute is such that, under the
preceding paragraphs, it may be said that the legal incidence of the
tax is on the vendor, the tax clearly appears to be directed against the
United States and to be violative of the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunities as currently enunciated. But if the incidence of such a
tax is on the vendee (the vendor acting merely as a collecting agent
for the taxing body), the question then arises as to whether the United
States, as vendor, may constitutionally be required to collect the tax
from the vendee where sales are made in which title of the United
States is transferred. This problem may be important from the stand-
point of dollar valuation since prices paid for materials by potential
vendees will be increased or decreased to the extent that state excise
taxes may or may not be applicable to their respective purchases.
Undoubtedly, Congress could pass legislation protecting its disposal
agencies from the burden of collection and remittance of such taxes."
But even in the absence of a Congressional declaration of immunity,
governmental action carried on by the United States has been held not
subject to state taxation, regulation, or control.41 It thus appears clear
40. See cases cited supra note 22.
41. 'Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441 (1943). "Thee inspection fees are lad di-
rectly upon the United States. They are money exactions the payment of which, if they are
enforceable, would be required before executing a function of government. Such a require-
ment is prohibited by the supremacy clause. We are not dealing, as in Grafes v. New Ycrh
ex rel. O'Keefe, [306 U. S. 466 (1939)], with a tax upon the salary of an employee, or as in
Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, with a tax upon the purchases of a supplier, or as in
Penn Dairies v. M1ilk Control Comm'n, 31S U. S. 261, with price control exercLsed over a
contractor with the United States. In these cases the exactions directly affected perons
who were acting for themselves and not for the United States. These fees are like a ta.,
upon the right to carry on the business of the post office or upon the privilege of Elling
United States bonds through federal officials. Admittedly the state inspection ervice is to
protect consumers from fraud but in carrying out such protection, the federal function
must be left free. This freedom is inherent in sovereignty. The silence of Congrez3 as to the
subjection of its instrumentalities, other than the United States, to local taxation or regula-
tion is to be interpreted in the setting of the applicable legislation and the particular exac-
tion. Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniscr Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 375, 378. But where, as here, the gc-crn-
wntal action is carried on by the United Stales itself and Congress dees ol ajjrinatirrly declMare
its instrumentalities or properly subject to regudation or taxation, the inWerent freedom con-
tinues." (Emphasis supplied.) See also Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 (1920). Cf. Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (U. S. 1842); Kentucky -. Dennizon, 24 How. 66 (U. S. IC9j;
Rn parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879). Where instrumentalities of the United States (such
as national banks) are involved, as distinguished from the United States itcelf, impozition of
tax collection duties by the state has been approved. In Colorado National Ban!: v. Bed-
ford, 310 U. S. 41 (1940), the Court reviewed a Colorado statute providing in substance that
any bank rendering safety deposit service should be liable for payment of a tax based on the
value of service, and that the bank should add the amount of the tax, so far as practicable,
to the amount charged for the service, showing the same as a separate item which should be
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that no Congressional action is required to establish the immunity of
the Federal Government from state regulation requiring government
agencies to act as tax-collecting agents for a state or local taxing unit.42
a debt due from the user to the bank. The bank was also forbidden to represent that it would
absorb the tax, and amounts paid by the user were stated by the statute to be public money
and trust funds of the state. The Court held that-the bank could be required to collect the
tax on behalf of the state, citing National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353 (U. S. 1869),
and Des Moines Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103 (1923). A further distinction of the
Bedford case from the present circumstances arises from the fact that in that case a private
instrumentality for profit was involved, whereas in the present problem the United States
itself is engaged in the sale of surplus properties. Emphasis in establishing intergovern-
mental exemption from taxation where the United States, rather than a private corporation
for profit, was involved, is found in the decision of the Court in Clallam County v. United
States, 263 U. S. 341 (1923). For further discussion of tax collection requirements and inter-
governmental immunities see Waite v. Dowley, 94 U. S. 527 (1876); Corwin, National-Slate
Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities (1937) 26 YALE L. J. 599; Plumb, Mfay the States be
Required to Assist in the Collection of Federal Taxes on Their Employees? (1942) 30 GEo. L. J.
534.
42. The parallel histories of the doctrine that the Federal Government is immune from
interference through regulation by state and local agencies, and the rule that the United
States is similarly immune from taxation, are important since cases relating to taxation
and regulation are cited by the courts interchangeably. Both doctrines arise from U. S.
CoNST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 13; Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; and Art. VI, cl. 2. The doctrine with respect to
state and local regulation has developed in a manner similar to the doctrine applied to state
excise taxes. In the era during which the Supreme Court concluded that an excise tax levied
against a contractor with the United States was violative of the doctrine of intergovern-
mental immunities, Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928), and Graves v.
Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 (1936), it had been similarly held that a Maryland statute requir-
ing persons operating motor trucks on highways to submit to an examination to determine
competence to drive could not constitutionally be applied to an employee of the Post Office
Department of the United States. The Court held that "such a requirement does not merely
touch the Government servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; it lays hold of them
in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that
the Government has pronounced sufficient." Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 57 (1920).
As encroachments on the Panhandle doctrine proceeded, Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509
(1931); Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 (1934); James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937), until the principle was specifically overruled, Ala-
bama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941), the area of intergovernmental immunity from
regulation was being equally restricted where applied to contractors with the United States.
It was held that a contractor constructing a building for the United States on a federal
enclave was subject to a state statute prescribing safety measures in construction, Stewart
& Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94 (1940); ef. United States v. City of Chester, 51 F. Supp.
573 (E. D. Pa. 1943), and that a state statute establishing minimum prices for dairy products
was applicable to a contractor selling such products to the armed forces of the United States,
Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U. S. 261 (1943). The doctrines are similar
in that where "governmental action is carried on by the United States itself and Congress
does not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject to regulation or
taxation, the inherent freedom continues." Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 448
(1943). While the area of intergovernmental immunity under each doctrine has been simi-
larly restricted with respect to contractors with the United States, the basic considerations
in determining immunity in each case are obviously different. As pointed out, supra, notes
32-6, and text, the basic determination in the tax cases relates to whether the legal incidence
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In many cases the practical effect of the immunity wil be limited
since commercial channels of distribution will be used in disposal of
surplus properties.43 Sales by the United States to distributors nor-
mally would not be taxed inasmuch as sales tax statutes specifically
exempt sales for resale purposes. Where no statutory exemption from
occupational, gross income, or gross sales taxes exists respecting mate-
rials purchased for resale,4 4 however, the desirability of minimizing
the total number of transfers is obvious, since each transfer folloving
the original transfer from the United States is a taxable event.
Although it therefore may be said that sales made by agencies of the
United States (such as the Department of Agriculture or the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation) are exempt from taxation, a sale of
contractor-owned property clearly does not partake of the immunity
of the United States.45 Even where a fixed price contractor is acting
in the interest of the United States in selling his termination inventory
and deducting the proceeds of the sale from his claim for termination
benefits, it seems proper to assume that the interest of the Govern-
ment is so remote that no claim for immunity could be asserted by the
contractor.
of the tax is upon the United States. Although the cases are far from clear, it appears that
the basic question in regulation cases is a determination of the circumstances under which a
regulation of the contractor is also a regulation of the United States. For example, if a
contractor with the United States is obligated by his contract to construct a building of
designated height under direction of the United States and a local regulation is invo!:ed to
prohibit the erection of a building of such height, the regulation would be of doubtful valid-
ity; on the other hand, as vas held in the Sadrahula case, supra, a requirement as to the con-
tractor's method of construction, at least so far as controlled by the contractor, may L2
considered valid. Cf. Smith, The .Nay Guards Its Tax Dollars Too (1945) 23 TAXrs 141, 143.
43. See SuRPLus PROPERTY AcT § 2(n). However, some sales directly to consumers
have been made and others may be expected to follow, especially in sales of single items of
high value. See testimony of Villiam Clayton, Surplus War Property Administrator,
Hearings before Special Committee on Post-WTar Economic Policy and Planrning Pursr!nt to
H. Res. 408, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 53. Moreover, sales of property under terminated
v.war contracts vill be made through contractors so far as possible and it is not unlikely that
some proportion of this property may go directly to consumers.
44. A number of states impose such taxes: ArYx STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 14093; IND. STAT.
ANN,. (Burns & Watson, 1943) §§ 64-2601 el seq.; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942) §§ 10103 el sC2.
NEW YORK Crm' AD. CODE (Chanler, Supp. 1942) c. 41, tit. RR; WaSH. REV. Sr,T.
(Remington, Supp. 1940) § 8370.4-370.15; IV. Va. CODE (,Michie, Sublett & Stedman,
1943) §§ 959 el seq.
45. As heretofore noted, independent contractors are not such instrumentalities of the
United States as to partake of the immunity of the sovereign. See note 30 supra. Accord-
ingly the Court has held that taxes may be laid on property owned by the contractor and
used in fulfilling his contract obligations. Van Brochlin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 177
(1886); Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 33 (U. S. 1873); Oslorn v. United States Bank,
9 Wheat. 738, 867 (U. S. 1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,436 (U. S. 1819). In
addition various state excise taxes levied against individuals and corporations doing busine-s
with the United States have been sustained, including a privilege tax measured by a per-
centage of gross premiums of a surety company furnishing insurance to United States cnter-
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If title to the property is re-transferred to the contractor by the
United States, it is equally clear that any subsequent sale of the prop-
erty purchased by him will not be immune from taxation. But where
the contractor disposes of termination inventory to which title is held
by the United States, the transfer is clearly made by the contractor as
agent for the United States; for the contractor has no personal interest
in the disposition of the property except in discharge of a contractual
requirement of cooperation with the United States. The situation
differs materially from that considered in Alabama v. King & Boozer 41
in which it was held that a contractor was not a purchasing agent of the
United States in performing services under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
contract inasmuch as the contractor had no power to pledge the credit
of the United States and that the United States was not obligated to
pay the purchase price.
In summary, it appears clear that a sale of personal property by the
United States directly, whether acting through a contractor, an own-
ing agency, or a disposal agency, is not subject to state and local sales
and occupational taxes. The tax cannot be laid directly on the United
States as a vendor; and, where the legal incidence of the tax is con-
sidered to be upon the vendee, the Federal Government cannot be
required to collect and remit the tax.
Where a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract exists between the con-
tractor and the United States, the situation is equally clear. In such
cases title to the property has usually been vested in the United States
(as was the case in Alabama v. King & Boozer) and where the con-
tractor transfers property, title to which is held by the United States,
he obviously could act only as agent for the United States. In such a
case, the sale is clearly immune from sales and similar taxes. No tax
immunity however, may be anticipated as to sales by the contractor
to third parties where title to the property is in the contractor, for it
is clear that the mere existence of the agency relationship between
the United States and a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractor does not cloak
the contractor with the immunity of the United States. 4 Sale of con-
tractor-owned termination inventory by a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee con-
tractor to the United States will, of course, be subject to taxation
to the same extent as similar sales by a fixed price contractor.
prises, Fidelity and Deposit Company v. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319 (1916); social security
taxes against a licensee of the United States, Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308
U. S. 358 (1939); transportation taxes, Wheeler v. United States Lumber Co., 281 U. S. 572
(1930); sales taxes, Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941); use taxes, Curry v.
United States, 314 U. S. 14 (1941); and gross income taxes, James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937), and Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186 (1937).




IV. DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS PROPERTY: STATE AIND LocAL USE TAXES
Application of the use tax is important to the disposition of surplus
property when an owning or disposal agency transfers property while
retaining the title or beneficial interest; this is the case, for example,
under the usual contract of sale, a conditional sale, or a lease of per-
sonal property.43 Although it has been held that persons using prop-
erty in the discharge of contractual obligations are not exempt from
application of a use tax because the contract is with the United States,4'
it has not been specifically decided whether a tax on the use of property
owned by the United States 11 contravenes the doctrine of intergovern-
mental immunities. The recent case of United States v. Allegheny
County 51 is, however, significant. There Allegheny County tax officials
assessed a property tax on real property owned by a contractor with
the United States, measuring the value of the property taxed by the
total value of the premises including machinery thereon owned by the
United States. The Court held that the value of the interest of the
48. Extremely wide latitude is given federal disposal agencies in methods of dispozing
of surplus war property. Section 15(a) of the Act provides that "Whenever any Government
agency is authorized to dispose of property under this Act, then the agency may dizpoZa of
such property by sale, exchange, lease or transfer, for cash, credit or other property, with or
without warranty, and upon such other terms and conditions as the agency deems proper."
49. Curry v. United States, 314 U. S. 14 (1941). The decision was based on an aszump-
tion that the contractors would have been subject to the tax under state law but for the as-
serted immunity arising from their contract with the United States. The Court held that
the contractors were neither exempt nor immune from the tax as agents of the United
States. The question of whether the materials subjected to tax were owned by the con-
tractor or the United States was not at issue in that case.
50. While use taxes are ordinarily levied only upon the use of personal property by its
owners, some states have extended the tax to cases where property is used by rezidents of
the state, even though title rests in a non-resident. Such a rule is specifically established in
some cases. ,VAsH. REV. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1940) § 8370-32; New York City Laws
1940, Local Law No. 82; Kansas State Commission of Revenue and Taxation, Articles and
Rulings 1940, Rule 46.
In any event, where the term "use" is defined by statute to include the e:xercize of any
incidents of ownership over personal property, a taxable event obviously arises by mere
possession of the property by a lessee, regardless of whether legal title to the property is held
by a non-resident. The term is so defined in many jurisdictions. CL.r. Rnv. & TAxx%, ilO
CODE (Deering, 1944) § 6009; IowA CODE (1939) § 6943.102(1); La. Laws 1944, Act. No. 57,
§ 2(h); Miss. Laws 1942, H. B. 719, § 2; N. C. Gen. Rev. Act (1939) art. XI, § S01(b); N. M.
STAT. AxN. (1941) § 76-1502(b); Ono GEN. CODE A 'ti. (Page, 1937), § 5546-25; QsaA.
STAT. (1941) tit. 68, § 1310(h); iAsH. REv. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1940) § 8370-35(b).
51. 322 U. S. 174, 187-S (1944): "We think, however, that the Government's property
interests are not taxable either to it or to its bailee. The 'Government' is an abstraction,
and its possession of property largely constructive. Actual pozsezsion and custody of Gov-
ernment property nearly always are in someone who is not himself the Government but
acts in its behalf and for its purposes. He may be an officer, an agent, or a contractor. His
personal advantages from the relationship by way of salary, profit, or beneficial personal use
of the property may be taxed as we have held. But neither he nor the Government can be
taxed for the Government's property interest."
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United States could not be included in the measure of the tax base.
By analogy it might be anticipated that a contractor cannot be sub-
jected to a use tax to the extent that an interest of the United States
is included in the measure of the tax. A judicial differentiation be-
tveen use and property taxes for the purposes of applying the doc-
trine of immunities would appear to be justified by neither logic nor
expedience: in neither case is an attempt made to tax the possessor
merely on the value of his possession; rather the tax is measured by the
value of the property, including interests therein owned by the United
States.12 The language of the Court in the Allegheny County case ap-
pears equally applicable in either case: "We discern little theoretical
difference, and no practical difference at all between what was done
and what would be done if the machinery were taxed in form." 11
Such a conclusion is supported by the fact that the use taxes here
considered actually impose a tax on the property of the United States
whether denominated an "excise" or a "property" tax. The basic
determination to be made in ascertaining whether a tax is actually
levied upon property is to analyze the "bundle of rights" comprising
all the incidents of ownership. It is clear that taxes on certain specific
incidents of ownership are not taxes on the property itself; 1 but a
tax which is imposed upon the exercise of any of the incidents of owner-
ship is obviously directed to the entire "bundle of rights," and has
52. There is, of course, a practical distinction in the use to which the property of the
United States is put. In the Allegheny County case the property was leased to expedite
production of materials of war for the United States; whereas disposal of surplus property
by lease or with retention of title does not present a case of similar national interest. Logi-
cally, however, questions of degree as to how property owned by the United States is used
should make little difference; as pointed out in Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151,
158 (1886): "The United States do not and cannot hold property, as a monarch may, for
private or personal purposes. All the property and revenues of the United States must be
held and applied, as all taxes, duties, imposts and excises must be laid and collected, 'to pay
the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.'
Constitution, art. 1, sect. 8, cl. 1; Dobbins v. Erie County Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435,
448." See, to the same effect, Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95,102
(1941). However, the Court has adopted a potentially conflicting rationale in holding that
a corporation organized by the United States under state law could not be subjected to state
property taxes, emphasizing that "This is not like the case of a corporation having its own
purposes as well as those of the United States and interested in profit on its own account."
Clallam Countyv. United States, 263 U. S. 341,345 (1923).
53. 322 U. S. 174, 185 (1944). It may be noted that here, in distinction to the Curry
case, 314 U. S. 14 (1941), the question of ownership of the property taxed was a basic issue
in the case.
54. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 582 (1937); Bromley v. McCaughn,
280 U. S. 124, 136 (1929); Dawson v. Kentucky Distillers & Warehouse Co., 255 U. S.
288,294 (1921).
55. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472 (1932); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933); Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914); Bowman v.
Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921).
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repeatedly been classified as a tax upon the property itself." In general,
the so-called "use" taxes under consideration are taxes of the latter
kind: they are not merely taxes upon utilization or consumption of
property, but operate upon the exercise of any of the incidents of
ownership over the property by the person taxed. 7
The use taxes in question may also be considered taxes on property
under the accepted doctrine that a tax falling upon an owner of prop-
erty merely because he is the owner is a tax on property.-- In the cases
here considered the tax falls on the taxpayer (whether he be the person
holding legal title or one designated by statute as owner because exer-
cising the incidents of ownership) simply because he exercises a right
which accrues to him as owner, even if such a right be no more than
mere possession of property within the taxing jurisdiction. 9 Thus it
appears that mere ownership is the occasion for the tax and that the
tax is in fact upon the property of the United States.
V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMM0UNITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR
DISPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY
It is well established that the immunity of real property from taxa-
tion ceases as soon as title to the property passes from the United
States, 0 notwithstanding that the United States retains a beneficial
56. See cases cited supra note 54. The result is further supported by a determination
that a tax on the right of withdrawal of whiskey from storage is a tax on the whic!zey itrjf.
Dawson v. Kentucky Distillers & Warehouse Co., 255 U. S. 288 (1921). Where Eome u-s
taxes have been attacked as violative of state constitutional restrictions relating to ad
valorem property taxes, state courts have, however, sustained the levies. Douglas Air-
craft Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 13 Cal. (2d) 545, 90 P. (2d) 572 (1939); National Linen S.xvice
Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 237 Ala. 360, 186 So. 478 (1939); Banner Laundering Co.
v. Grundy, 297 Mich. 419, 293 N.W. 73 (1941); Spokane v. State, 193 Wash. 6S2, 89 P.
(2d) 826 (1939). The Douglas decision vs reached on the ground that the u3z tax there
in question was unlike standard property taxes in that it did not bear Eome of the hiztoric
attributes of such taxes: "It does not apply to the use of property to be resold. It dcs not
recur annually, but falls due only once. It is not imposed on a fixed day although it is
imposed quarterly . . ." Id. at 572. It should be noted that the foregoing distinctions
were rejected by the United States Supreme Court in considering constitutional limita-
tions affecting state taxation of materials in interstate commerce. Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 582 (1937). These formal distinctions seem to be equally inap-
plicable in determining whether a state or local tax on (or measured by) property owmed
by the United States is violative of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity from
taxation.
57. See statutes cited supra note 50.
58. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 137 (1929); Dawson v. Kentucky Distillers- &
Warehouse Co., 255 U. S. 288,294 (1921).
59. As indicated supra note 56, some state courts have, however, held that Etate uc2
taxes are not ad valorem property taxes within constitutional restrictions.
60. Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392 (1885); Tucker v. FerguZon, 22 Wall. 527
(U. S. 1874); Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210 (U. S. 1866); Carroll v. Safford, 3 Horw.
441 (U. S. 1845).
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interest or right of reversion.61 It is equally clear that where the United
States has legal title to real property, and no other party has an interest
therein, such property is not subject to taxation by state and local
taxing jurisdictions. 2
Pursuant to the requirement of the Act that monopolistic practices
should be discouraged,63 federally-owned real estate, or interests
therein, may be transferred with reservation of title in the United
States as a means of control over use of the property. 4 This is par-
ticularly anticipated in industries, such as aluminum and synthetic
rubber, where the major portion of plant facilities are owned by the
United States. Retention of title by the United States as a means of
insuring payment of the purchase price by vendees of doubtful solvency
may also be anticipated as a matter of business practice.
The taxability of such property depends upon the nature of the
title reserved by the United States. As long as the United States has
only bare legal title, all beneficial interests being held by a transferee
in possession, the transferee has what is described as equitable "title"
and the whole value of the property is taxable to him." The cases,
61. Baltimore Shipbuilding Co.-v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, 382 (1904), in which title
to the property was held by the transferee, where it was said: "It would be a very harsh
doctrine that would deny the right of the states to tax lands because of a mere possibility
that they might lapse to the United States." See People ex rel. Donner Union Coke Corp. v.
Burke, 204 App. Div. 557, 198 N. Y. Supp. 601 (4th Dep't 1923), citing Wisconsin Railroad
Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496, 507 (1890), to establish that even where title had been
transferred from the United States to the taxpayer the property could not be taxed so long
as the United States held a present interest therein, and distinguishing the cited case be-
cause there the interest of the United States in the property was remote, arising only out of
a condition subsequent, breach of which would vest title in the United States.
62. It is undisputed that property in which legal title and full beneficial interest is
held by the United States is not subject to state and local taxation. The principle follows
as a matter of course from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), and was vigorously
asserted in Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1886), in which many earlier decisions
of state and federal courts were cited. The principle has often been reaffirmed. United
States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174 (1944); Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United
States, 290 U. S. 89 (1933); City of New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547 (1928);
Lee v. Osceola Improvement Dist., 268 U. S. 643 (1925); Clallam County v. United States,
263 U. S. 341 (1923); Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219 (1922); Wisconsin R. R. v. Price County,
133 U. S. 496 (1890).
63. SURPLUS PROPERTY ACT § 2.
64. Under § 15(a) of the Act disposition of real property of the United States may be
consummated upon such terms and conditions as the disposal agency deems proper.
65. City of New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547 (1928); Union Oil Co. v.
Smith, 249 U. S. 337 (1919); Bothwell v. Bingham County, 237 U. S. 642 (1915); Sargent v.
Herrick, 221 U. S. 404 (1911); Elder v. Wood, 208 U. S. 226 (1908); Hussman v. Durham,
165 U. S. 144 (1897); Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526 (1895);
Wisconsin R. R. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496 (1890); Northern Pacific R. R. v. Traill
County, 115 LT. S. 600 (1885); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762 (1876); Tucker v. Ferguson,
22 Wall. 527 (U. S. 1874); Railroad Co. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444 (U. S. 1874); Railway Co.
v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603 (U. S. 1872); Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210 (U. S. 1866);
Carroll v. Safford, 3 How. 441 (U. S. 1845).
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however, do not satisfactorily decide what nature or volume of bene-
ficial interest is necessary to establish equitable "title" so as to subject
a private person in possession to a tax on the property.
For example, immunity from taxation has been denied where, under
land patent procedures, nothing remained to be done to perfect the
claim (to title) of an entryman having beneficial use of the property
to the exclusion of the United States; CS nor has immunity been granted
where a railroad's right to a patent on public lands v.as complete, al-
though the patent had not been issued ' In the same v.ay the right of a
discoverer of minerals has been held to be taxable property even
though title to the land was in the United States. 3
Conversely, it has been held that where a private party in possession
had not completed payments to the United States for improvements on
reclaimed property to which the United States had title, the property
was not subject to taxation under the theory that the private person
had equitable "title." cl Nor is the transferee of terminable leasehold
interests a holder of equitable "title." 71 And where payments were
66. Bothwell v. Bingham County, 237 U. S. 642 (1915); Sargent v. Herricl:, 221 U. S.
404 (1911); Wisconsin R. R. x. Price County, 133 U. S. 496 (1S90); Deffebaci: v. Hawhe,
115 U. S. 392 (1885); Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210 (U. S. 1S66); Carroll v. Safford,
3 How. 441 (U. S. 1845).
67. Railway Co. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444 (U. S. 1874); Railway Co. v. Preccott, 16
Wall. 603 (U. S. 1872). Reference has also been made to the rule in cases involving exprezs
Congressional permission to tax. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Myers, 172 U. S. 589 (1899);
Northern Pacific R. R. v. Traill County, 115 U. S. 600 (18385).
68. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U. S. 337 (1919); Elder v. Wood, 203 U. S. 226 (190,);
Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762 (1876).
69. Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219, 229 (1922). The Court distinguished the earlier
cases holding property taxable where final certificates had been issued, mining claims were
involved, or ex-press authority to tax was given by statute. It vas also said- "Moreover, the
confusion caused in the past by the taxation, when specifically permitted, of indefinite and
inchoate interests of the beneficiaries of government land grants, should prevent an inference
of the congressional intention to depart from the rule requiring an equitable title in the
entryman before state taxation, unless a purpose to permit earlier taxation is exprezs or
strongly implied . . . ." Id. at 232.
70. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 186-4 (1944):
"Mesta has some legal and beneficial interest in this property. It is a bailee for
mutual benefit. Whether such a right of possession and use in view of all the cir-
cumstances could be taxed by appropriate proceedings we do not decide. Its lea-
hold interest is subject to some qualification of the right to use the property except
for gun manufacture, is limited to the period it engages in such work, and is prhaps
burdened by other contractual conditions. We have held that where private in-
terests in property were so preponderant that all the Government held was a nahed
title and a nominal interest, the whole value was taxable to the equitable owner.
Norllzeri; Pacific R. Co. v. Myers, 172 U. S. 589; New Brunswidh v. Urik-d Seks,
276 U. S. 547. But that is not the situation here, and the State has made no effort
to segregate Mlesta's interest and tax it. The full value of the proparty, including
the whole ownership interest, as well as whatever value proper appraisal might
attribute to the leasehold, was included in Mesta's assessment."
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made under an option to purchase property from the government, it
was held that the property was not taxable to the vendee until he was
entitled to receive a deed from the United States, at which time it was
said equitable "title" passed to him.
71
In view of the intent of Congress, as ascertained from the legislative
history of the Surplus Property Act,72 it appears reasonable to con-
clude that, at least in transfers of real property where title as well as a
beneficial interest in property remains in the United States, the prop-
erty may not be taxed as such. Even in the absence of the legislative
history of the Act the cases seem to establish that no equitable "title"
is held by one whose interest in the property is subject to an obligation
for payment of moneys to, or reservation of control over the property
by, the United States.
Some current statutes, however, purport to tax the interest of a
taxpayer in real property, as separate and distinct from the real prop-
erty itself.7 3 It is clear from United States v. Allegheny County that
where the United States has legal title plus a portion of the beneficial
interest, the value of the Government's interest may not be used in the
measure of the tax to be paid by the private person holding the re-
mainder of the beneficial interest.7 4 The question of whether the bene-
ficial interest of a private person in realty may be taxed by state and
local taxing units when the United States holds title to the property
was expressly reserved in that case. It is established, however, that
where the United States has a right of reversion for breach of contract,
or holds a limited right of user, power to foreclose a tax lien against the
private person in possession is not such a potential interference with
the United States as to nullify the application of a tax.7" This reasoning
may be applied to sales of surplus property where title is retained by
the United States simply to insure payment of the purchase price.
It is doubtful, therefore, that the interest of a private person in
possession is immune from taxation where the only interest of the
United States in real property is a right to payment under a contract
71. Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375 (1904). The New York"
Supreme Court has also held that a transferee in possession of real property of the United
States under a contract for deed reserving title in the transferor until payments under the
contract have been completed does not have "equitable title" to the property.
72. Section 22(j) of the Senate bill (S. 2065) provided that property might be taxed
after a purchaser took possession thereof, notwithstanding that title still remained in the
United States, but that, in the event of reversion of all interests to the United States prior
to passage of title, all liens for taxes should be extinguished. This section was eliminated
when the bill was returned with approval of House and Senate conferees. 90 Cong. Rec.,
Sept. 19, 1944, at 8013.
73. E.g., CALIF. REV. AND TAXATIOx CODE (Deering, 1944) §§ 103, 104; MAss. GEN-
ERAL LAWS (Ter. ed. 1932) c. 59, § 11.
74. United Statesv. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
75. Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375 (1904); cf. United States v.
Rickert, 188 U. S. 432,438 (1903).
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for sale secured by retention of title. This conclusion is supported by
the general trend of recent decisions restricting intergovernmental
immunities. 6 On the other hand, where the United States, for reasons
of national policy, retains extensive control of the operations of a
private person in possession of federally-owmed property, the validity
of state and local taxes is more doubtful.
Other tax problems may well impede disposition of real property by
the United States. The statutory waiver of the immunity of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation and its subsidiaries may raise a
problem when that corporation acts as a disposal agency for realty
owned by an agency exempt from tax. However, since there is no
provision in the Act for passage of title from the owning to the disposal
agency, and since the benefits of sale do not accrue to the disposal
agency,n it seems clear that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
acts in such cases only as agent in the sale of surplus real property.
Hence, any title or interest reserved to the United States in such trans-
fers is retained by the owning agencies rather than by the disposal
agency and is probably exempt from taxation in spite of the waiver of
immunity of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
VI. CONTRACT TERMINATION PROCEDURES: INTANGIBLE TAXEs
Problems concerning the imposition of ad valorem taxes measured
by moneys owed or advanced to contractors by the United States may
become increasingly important. Whether moneys advanced in con-
trolled accounts by the United States to the contractors are taxable to
the contractors will not, of course, become important under contract
termination procedures.78 However, substantial sums will be owing to
the contractors by the United States as a result of contract termina-
tions. In such cases contractors may obtain loans, guaranteed in part
by the United States, on the basis of their termination claims. Con-
sequently they may, for indefinite periods of time, hold credits for sums
owed to them by the United States at the same time owing a substan-
tially equal sum of money to public or private financing organizations
for moneys borrowed.
The immunity of such credits from taxation by state and local
76. See note 20 supra.
77. SURPLUS PROPERTY AcT § 30.
78. In United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 188-S9 (1944), the question
of taxability of such advances, while discussed in a dictum, appears to have been definitely
resolved:
"A State may tax personal property and might well tax it to one in whose po:-
session it was found, but it could hardly tax one of its citizens because of money3
of the United States which were in his possession as Collector of Internal Revenue,
Postmaster, Clerk of the United States Court, or other federal officer, agent, or
contractor. We hold that Government-owmed property, to the full extent of the
Government's interest therein, is immune from taxation, either as against the Gov-
ernment itself or as against one who holds it as a bailee."
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jurisdictions therefore becomes important. With respect to subcon-
tractors, the Act contemplates that primary liability for payment shall
rest upon the prime contractor and not upon the United States; in
such an event the question of taxability of the claim against the United
States will not arise with respect to the subcontractor unless the United
States has specificially undertaken to discharge his claim. 9
The power of a state to assess property taxes against private parties,
measured by the value of open accounts owed to them by the United
States, was supported by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v.
Davis.8 0 In that case the Court upheld the power of a state to impose
such taxes, limiting the immunity from taxation of obligations owed to
private parties by the United States to cases in which the credit in-
strument was characterized by:
"(1) written documents, (2) the bearing of interest, (3) a
binding promise by the United States to pay specified sums
at specified dates and (4) specific Congressional authorization,
which also pledged the faith and credit of the United States
in support of the promise to pay." 81
Under these circumstances it seems obvious that mere claims against
the United States for amounts due the claimant by reason of contract
termination would be subject to state and local property taxation
measured by the value of the claims.
CONCLUSION
An understanding of tax liability generally, and of the scope of the
immunities doctrine in particular, by government representatives,
contractors, state and local tax officials and consumers is a basic ele-
ment in facilitating prompt and effective disposition of surplus prop-
erty and termination of contracts. Further, a determination of what
procedures in contract termination and property disposition will best
serve the national interest from a tax standpoint can obviously be
made only after analysis of the impact of the immunities doctrine on
procedures under study. For example, it is of obvious importance, in
determining whether the United States should collect sales and use
taxes for the states, to know that legal responsibility for such collection
cannot be imposed by the states or disposal agencies and that, while
sales of termination inventory by a contractor to private persons are
taxable where the property is owned by him, the same transaction is
tax exempt where property is owned by the United States. It is hoped
that the foregoing discussion may serve to crystallize the scope of the
immunities doctrine in these and similar problems incidental to con-
tract termination and disposition of surplus property.
79. As authorized by Pub. L. 395,78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) § 8(d).
80. 323 U.S. 111 (1944).
81. Id.atlls.
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